Vol. 14 No. 11 · 11 June 1992
pages 21-22 | 3870 words

Severals
Ian Hacking
- First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind by Stephen Braude
Routledge, 283 pp, £35.00, October 1991, ISBN 0 415 03951 7
Stephen Braude is a philosopher who thinks that the phenomenon of multiple personality teaches something about the human mind. Until recently he would not have had much of a phenomenon: a thin diet of 19th-century anecdotes, a little flurry of cases in France after 1875, and a few more described at greater length in America after the turn of the century. Or he could have resorted to the Doppelgänger of romantic literature, well enough covered in past issues of the London Review, and analysed in that amazingly many-layered book Doubles by its co-editor, Karl Miller. But something new and strange has been happening in North America – a veritable epidemic of multiple personalities. It began about 1972. It was called an epidemic by one psychiatrist in an essay published in 1982. By 1992 the disorder is flourishing. Not that there is any consensus that there ‘is’ such a condition. There is what can only be called a multiple personality movement built roughly as a pyramid. At the top is a relatively small number of dedicated psychiatrists who diagnose literally hundreds of patients. Then there is a larger number of clinical psychologists who recognise some of their clients as multiples. Next, at least in some regions, there is a very substantial number of social workers who find the condition in their case work. And finally there are the multiples themselves, some of whom organise themselves into self-help groups, publish newsletters and the like.
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Letters
Vol. 14 No. 13 · 9 July 1992
From Daniel C. Dennett
Ian Hacking disparages what he takes to be my account of Multiple Personality Disorder in his review of Stephen Braude’ s book on the subject (LRB, 11 June), but from what he says about it, I suspect that he has been misled by the book under review into confusing two different theories of mine: the Multiple Drafts Model of normal consciousness, which I developed with Marcel Kinsbourne, and the account of Multiple Personality Disorder that I developed with Nicholas Humphrey (Humphrey and Dennett, ‘Speaking for Our Selves’, Raritan 9, No 1, Summer 1989). The latter is given a brief summary in my book, Consciousness Explained – too brief, I am now inclined to think, in the light of this understandable confusion. I claim that the Multiple Drafts Model can provide the basis for all varieties of human consciousness, normal and pathological, and hence it must be capable of explaining the phenomena underlying Multiple Personality Disorder: but the peculiarities of MPD require a theory over and above the Multiple Drafts Model, and I think Humphrey and I have given such an account. It has nothing to do with ‘cognitive modules’: as an unflagging critic of Fodor’s concept of modules, I must protest Braude’s misnomer and Hacking’s adoption of it. The Humphrey-Dennett model of MPD has been praised by many of the professionals in psychotherapy whose opinion counts highest with me (and, I expect, with Hacking), precisely for its balanced attention to just the sort of details Hacking chides me for overlooking: ‘the square pegs of cognitive modules simply don’t fit into the round holes of multiple experience’ – I couldn’t agree more. I wish Hacking, whose historical perspective on MPD is nonpareil, had contrasted Braude’s account with the Humphrey-Dennett account, and not with Braude’s unsympathetic version of my account.
Daniel C. Dennett
Center for Cognitive Studies,