Life at the end of inquiry
Richard Rorty
- Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol. III by Hilary Putnam
Cambridge, 312 pp, £22.50, June 1984, ISBN 0 521 24672 5
In theory, it is the highest virtue of the philosopher to be constantly receptive to criticism, always willing to abandon his own views upon hearing a better argument. In practice, students tend to become exasperated when an important philosopher changes his mind. It suits their doxographic purposes best to use the philosopher’s name to denote the monolithic set of doctrines which initially made him famous. Bertrand Russell is an example of an important and influential philosopher who changed his mind several times and thereby induced exasperation. Hilary Putnam is another. Just when people have finished writing a devastating critique of Putnam, they discover that Putnam has written a similar critique of his own previous views. This refusal to serve as an unmoving target has sometimes led to attempts to dismiss him as a reed shaken by every new wind of doctrine. But such attempts fail, for Putnam is one of the most vigorous and thoughtful representatives of the second generation of analytic philosophers.
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Vol. 6 No. 14/15 · 2 August 1984 » Richard Rorty » Life at the end of inquiry (print version)
pages 6-7 | 2571 words